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COMMENT
Judicial Review of Cost-Benefit
Analysis Under NEPA
I. INTRODUCTION
Cost-benefit analysis' has long played an important but contro-
versial role in the decisionmaking process leading to approval of
public works projects undertaken by the United States.2 Agencies
involved in the development of water and related resources, such
as the Army Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation,
use cost-benefit calculations to determine whether a particular
project is economically feasible. If the anticipated benefits exceed
the projected costs, an agency is justified in recommending the
project, since theoretically there will be a net economic gain to
society.
Until recently, federal courts have refused to review agency
cost-benefit procedures and conclusions, leaving the supervisory re-
sponsibilities to Congress and the agencies. 3 This deference to
agency cost-benefit determinations has been grounded both on le-
gal and pragmatic considerations. Legally, it is consistent with
the courts' general policy against reviewing matters within an
agency's special expertise.4 From a practical standpoint, courts
have been reluctant to join in the continuing theoretical debate
among economists and administrators over the merits of various
cost-benefit techniques.5 Because of the courts' "hands off" ap-
proach, critics of the pro-development bias in agency cost-benefit
calculations have been forced to take their case to Congress and
the individual agencies.
1. For a description of cost-benefit analysis, see text accompanying notes
18-36 infra.
2. See notes 37-44 and accompanying text infra.
3. E.g., Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508,
527 (1941). See notes 45-48 and accompanying text infra.
4. See generally K.C. DAvis, 4 An'm sTRATVE LAW TREATISE § 30.09, at
240-46 (1958); L. JAFFE, JUDIcIAL CONTROL OF ADAIVIIISTRATIVE ACTION
576-85 (1965).
5. See notes 18-26 and accompanying text infra.
REVIEW OF COST-BENEFIT
Adoption of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969
("NEPA")6 and subsequent judicial interpretation of the "action-
forcing" provisions in section 102,7have reopened the question of
whether courts should review cost-benefit analysis. NEPA is an
environmental full-disclosure law, which requires all federal agen-
cies planning projects that will substantially affect the environ-
ment to consider the possible environmental effects. The Act does
not expressly require administrative agencies to undertake cost-
benefit analysis while preparing proposals for new federal projects.
But in the leading case interpreting NEPA, Calvert Cliffs' Coordi-
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970).
7. The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent
possible: (1) the policies, regulations, and public laws of the
United States shall be interpreted and administered in ac-
cordance with the policies set forth in this chapter, and (2)
all agencies of the Federal Government shall-(A) utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach which
will insure the integrated use of the natural and social sci-
ences and the environmental design arts in planning and in
decisionmaking which may have an impact on man's environ-
ment;(B) identify and develop methods and procedures, in con-
sultation with the Council on Environmental Quality estab-
lished by subchapter 11 of this chapter, which will insure
that presently unquantified environmental amenities and val-
ues may be given appropriate consideration in decisionmak-
ing along with economic and technical considerations;(C) include in every recommendation or report on pro-
posals for legislation and other major Federal actions signif-
icantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a de-
tailed statement by the responsible official on-(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot
be avoided should the proposal be implemented,(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of
man's environment and the maintenance and enhance-
ment of long-term productivity, and(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of
resources which would be involved in the proposed ac-
tion should it be implemented.
Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible Fed-
eral official shall consult with and obtain the comments of
any Federal agency which has jurisdiction by law or special
expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved.
Copies of such statement and the comments and views of the
appropriate Federal, State, and local agencies, which are au-
thorized to develop and enforce environmental standards,
shall be made available to the President, the Council on En-
vironmental Quality and to the public as provided by section
552 of Title 5 (United States Code), and shall accompany the
proposal through the existing agency review processes; ....
Id. § 4332. Use of the term "action-forcing" to describe these sections
originated in the Senate hearings on the bills which eventually became
NEPA. Hearings on S. 1075, S. 237, and S. 1752 Before the Senate
Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 116 (1969).
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nating Committee, Inc. v. AEC,8 the Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia held the Act mandated a "rigorous balancing
of costs and benefits" 9 which would ensure that "the optimally
beneficial action is finally taken."' 0
The Calvert Cliffs' decision left many questions unresolved, be-
cause the court failed to elaborate on the type of cost-benefit bal-
ancing required under NEPA. Calvert Cliffs' may be read as re-
quiring all federal agencies to undertake the type of rigorous cost-
benefit analysis previously conducted only in the water resource
field. The decision also suggests that agency cost-benefit tech-
niques, once thought to be immune from judicial review, are now
open to court scrutiny under the broad mandate of NEPA. In the
NEPA litigation since Calvert Cliffs', federal courts, at the urg-
ing of environmental lawyers, have been forced to redefine their
role in overseeing cost-benefit analysis.
Both the possibilities and the problems of expanding judicial
oversight in the cost-benefit area were illustrated in a decision
handed down by the District Court for the Southern District of
Texas. In Sierra Club v. Froehlke," the court enjoined construc-
tion of the Trinity channelization and Wallisville reservoir projects
until an adequate environmental impact statement ("EIS") could
be prepared. The court concluded, inter alia, that NEPA mandates
judicial review of cost-benefit calculations prepared by the Corps
of Engineers to justify project approval. The court reasoned that
the Corps' procedures tended to intertwine environmental and non-
environmental values so that claimed environmental benefits were
quantified in economic terms; at the same time, the procedures
failed to quantify or consider certain environmental costs. Hence,
the court found it could not "bypass an examination of the benefit-
cost analysis, at least insofar as it is relevant to environmental
considerations."' 2 The decision concluded with extensive guide-
lines for preparation of a new EIS.13
The Trinity/Wallisville decision was seen as a victory for en-
vironmentalists eager to open the cost-benefit area to court re-
view.' 4 But the very thoroughness of the decision raises doubts
8. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
9. Id. at 1128.
10. Id. at 1123.
11. 359 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
12. Id. at 1363.
13. Id. at 1363-83.
14. See, e.g., F. ANDEasoN, NEPA IN THE CouRTs: A LEGAL ANALYSIS
OF THE NATIONAL ENvmoNWIENTAL Poricy ACT OF 1969 263-65 (1973),
[hereinafter cited as ANDERSON].
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whether, as a practical matter, courts should have an ongoing role
in the review of agency cost-benefit determinations. The decision
spans one hundred one pages in the reporter, including twenty four
pages of introductory material, twenty pages bearing directly on
cost-benefit analysis, and numerous technical exhibits. Such de-
tail is not typical of NEPA litigation, nor is it a sufficient reason
to avoid a court's judicial responsibilities. Nevertheless, the Trin-
ity/Walisville case may cause federal courts to hesitate before
looking behind an agency's cost-benefit declarations.
This Comment analyzes the approach which courts have taken
toward the review of cost-benefit determinations under NEPA.
The underlying issue of whether NEPA mandates substantive ju-
dicial review of agency impact statements will not be considered
directly, since it has been discussed extensively by courts15 and
commentators. 6 This writer agrees with those circuit courts of
appeals which have held NEPA requires courts to review an
agency's impact statement on the substantive merits.1
15. See cases cited in note 17 infra.
16. The bulk of scholarly opinion favors substantive review on the merits.
See, e.g., ANDERsoN, supra note 14, at 258-65; Cohen & Warren, Ju-
dicial Recognition of the Substantive Requirements of the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 13 B.C. InD. & CoM. L. REv. 685
(1972); Sive, Some Thoughts of an Environmental Lawyer in the
Wilderness of Administrative Law, 70 COLum. L. Rnv. 612 (1970);
Comment, Judicial Review of Factual Issues Under the National En-
vironmental Policy Act, 51 ORE. L. REv. 408 (1972); Note, Substantive
Review Under the National Environmental Policy Act: EDF v.
Corps of Engineers, 3 EcOLOGY L.Q. 173 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
Note, Substantive Review]; contra, Cramton & Berg, On Leading a
Horse to Water: NEPA and the Federal Bureaucracy, 71 Mca. L.
RPv. 511, 534-36 (1973).
17. Initially, courts confined themselves to strict scrutiny of § 102's pro-
cedural requirements, concerning sufficiency of an environmental im-
pact statement (EIS). E.g., Committee for Nuclear Responsibility,
Inc. v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783 (D.C. Cir. 1971); EDF v. Corps of En-
gineers, 348 F. Supp. 916, 925 (N.D. liss. 1972). But in an appeal
concerning the sufficiency of an EIS for the Gillham Dam project in
Arkansas, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit held under
NEPA, "courts have an obligation to review substantive agency de-
cisions on the merits." EDF v. Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d 289,
298 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973). The court
applied the traditional standard of review for an informal agency de-
cision: whether it is "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise not in accordance with law." 470 F.2d at 300, quoting
Administrative Procedure Act, § 10(e), 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (A) (1970),
as applied in Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S.
402, 416 (1970). For a discussion of the Overton Park decision, see
notes 154-57 and accompanying text infra.
The Eighth Circuit position that agency compliance with NEPA
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This Comment contends that NEPA does not require a federal
agency not involved in water resources development to develop re-
fined cost-benefit projections as a part of an impact statement. Re-
quiring wholesale adoption of cost-benefit quantification would be
contrary to the purpose of the EIS, would pose great theoretical
difficulties, and would encourage agencies to use the statement for
project justification, rather than for environmental auditing.
Where water resources agencies must prepare detailed cost-benefit
evaluations for other purposes, however, these analyses should be
included in the EIS and subjected to limited judicial review. Per-
sons and agencies entitled to receive information about a project
under NEPA's authority are entitled to know the factual basis for
a decision to proceed with the project, including any cost-benefit
determinations. Similarly, to conduct the point-by-point review of
agency decisionmaking processes required by NEPA, federal courts
must ascertain that environmental values have been given full con-
sideration during agency cost-benefit calculations.
Part II of this Comment is a brief over-view of the economic,
political and legal framework for cost-benefit analysis. Part III de-
scribes the development of the judicial gloss on NEPA requiring
inclusion of cost-benefit "balancing" in project impact statements.
This part also explores the desirability of patterning NEPA "bal-
ancing" on the model of cost-benefit analysis traditionally con-
ducted for water resource projects. Part IV analyzes the various
judicial approaches toward substantive review of traditional cost-
benefit analysis under NEPA. It suggests recent improvements in
the guidelines for water resource cost-benefit analysis will make
it easier to open such analysis to limited NEPA review.
is reviewable on the merits has been adopted in five other circuits.
EDF v. Corps of Engineers, 492 F.2d 1123, 1139 (5th Cir. 1974); Sierra
Club v. Froehlke, 486 F.2d 946, 951-53 (7th Cir. 1973); Silva v. Lynn,
482 F.2d 1282, 1283 (lst Cir. 1973); Conservation Council v. Froehlke,
473 F.2d 664, 665 (4th Cir. 1973); Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm.,
Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The Sixth Circuit
has implicitly approved substantive review. EDF v. TVA, 492 F.2d
466 (6th Cir. 1974), affg per curiam 371 F. Supp. 1004, 1013 (E.D.
Tenn. 1973). Appellate panels in the Ninth Circuit have reached
contradictory results. Compare EDF v. Armstrong, 487 F.2d 814, 817
(9th Cir. 1973) (permitting substantive review), with Jicarilla Apache
Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 471 F.2d 1275, 1279-80 (9th Cir. 1973).
Of the appellate courts that have considered the issue, only the Tenth
Circuit has consistently opposed substantive review. National He-
lium Corp. v. Morton, 486 F.2d 995, 1001-03 (1974), aff'g 455 F.2d 650,
656 (10th Cir. 1971). In light of the lingering confusion on this point,
the issue should be settled by the United States Supreme Court.
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II. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: AN OVERVIEW
Cost-benefit analysis has been the subject of numerous works
in the fields of economics and public administration. A brief sum-
mary of the economic, political and legal context will nevertheless
be helpful in evaluating the current judicial concern with cost-
benefit techniques.
A. Economic Considerations
Cost-benefit analysis is used 'by government agencies to deter-
mine whether a proposed public investment will result in an effi-
cient allocation of resources.'8 Traditionally, the aim of cost-bene-
fit analysis has been to identify and measure all the economic costs
and benefits which will be derived from a project.19 After they
are expressed in monetary terms, the costs and benefits to be real-
ized in the future are discounted to their present value by apply-
ing an appropriate interest rate. This discounting procedure re-
flects the assumption common to all private and public investment
decisions that a current investment should yield at least a given
minimum rate of return in the future.20 Once the present worth
18. For general discussions of the practice and problems of cost-benefit
analysis, see Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289, 1362-80 (S.D.
Tex. 1973); Wildavsky, The Political Economy of Efficiency: Cost-
Benefit Analysis, Systems Analysis, and Program Budgeting, PoIat-
ICAL SCIaNcE AND PuBLIc PoIcY 57 (A. Ranney ed. 1968); Hammond,
Convention and Limitation in Benefit-Cost Analysis, 6 NAT. REs. J.
195 (1966); Joskow, Cost-Benefit Analysis for Environmental Impact
Statements, 91 PuB. I T-L. FORT. No. 2, at 21 (1973) [hereinafter cited
as Joskow, Cost-Benefit Analysis]. For a more complete understand-
ing of practical and policy considerations affecting cost-benefit tech-
niques from the viewpoint of the welfare economist, see Prest &
Turvey, Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Survey, 75 EcoN. J. 683 (1965);
Note, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the National Environmental Policy
Act of 1969, 24 STAN. L. RV. 1092 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Note,
Cost-Benefit Analysis]. Two recent law review articles have dis-
cussed the use of cost-benefit analysis in the context of specific re-
source projects. Findley, The Planning of a Corps of Engineers Res-
ervoir Project: Law, Economics and Politics, 3 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1973)
(Oakley Reservoir Project in Illinois); Krutilla & Cicchetti, Evalua-
ting Benefits of Environmental Resources with Special Application
to the Hells Canyon, 12 NAT. REs. J. 1 (1972).
Professor Tribe has recently examined the philosophical orientation
of cost-benefit analysis and environmental policy. Tribe, Ways Not
to Think About Plastic Trees: New Foundations for Environmental
Law, 83 YALE L.J. 1315 (1974).
19. The problem of identifying and monetizing environmental costs and
benefits is especially troublesome. See note 24 and accompanying
text infra.
20. The process of discounting has been described as "recognizing the
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of all costs and benefits is known, the decisionmaker may either
compute the ratio of the figures or a net amount (benefits minus
costs). An agency theoretically is justified in proposing a project
only if its anticipated economic 'benefits exceed its anticipated
costs.
2 1
Even this simple description is sufficient to expose important
theoretical problems which trouble many economists and adminis-
trators. One commentator has offered a succinct summary of the
questionable assumptions underlying cost-benefit analysis:
[Cost-benefit analysis] assumes that the costs to be incurred
are reasonably predictable; that the benefits are also reasonably
predictable; that both are well-defined and are quantifiable in
monetary terms; that the discount rate to be used is uniquely
determinable; and that there are real alternatives against which
the results can be compared. 22
Other theoretical problems become apparent when decisionmakers
are asked to incorporate intangible values such as environmental
amenities into this type of analysis. For example, cost-benefit
calculations have traditionally employed a single criterion-eco-
nomic efficiency-to measure costs and benefits. Use of this criter-
ion assumes that the public investment occurs in a purely competi-
tive market and ignores external effects such as environmental pol-
lution.23  Even if decisionmakers attempt to incorporate environ-
time value of money." Joskow, Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 18,
at 22.
For example, if the appropriate discount rate is 5 per cent,
$1.05 one year from now is only worth one dollar today.
Otherwise stated, $1.05 one year in the future discounted to
today is equal to one dollar. There is no other way to take
account of costs and benefits which do not accrue in the pres-
ent. All future figures must be discounted to today if a
proper calculation of net benefits is to be obtained.
Id. Selection of an appropriate interest rate and project life span
has been a key concern of environmental groups in challenging re-
source projects. A project's costs may be reduced by giving it a
longer life span or lower interest rate. See Prest & Turvey, supra
note 18, at 697-700; notes 166, 172, 175 and accompanying text infra.
21. Cost-benefit ratios are rarely used to compare two projects within
an agency. Once the agency establishes that a project will result in
a net economic benefit, other, political factors enter into the decision
to propose the project and Congress' decision to support it. See note
43 and accompanying text infra.
22. Joskow, Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 18, at 22.
23. Until recently, the economic efficiency criterion took the form of a
"national income" objective in government cost-benefit analysis.
That is, a project's costs and benefits were evaluated entirely on the
basis of whether they contributed to or subtracted from the national
income. THE PRESIDENT'S WATER RESOURCES COUNCIL POLICIES, STAND-
ARDS AM PROCEDURES IN THE FORMULATION, ,VALUATION, AND RE-
REVIEW OF COST-BENEFIT
mental factors, such factors are difficult, if not impossible, to quan-
tify in monetary terms.24 Finally, it has been argued that cost-
benefit analysis consistently underestimates the costs represented
by technological change, the growing demand for environmental
amenities, and the interdependence among various government in-
vestments and private resource use.25 Such serious weaknesses in
the theoretical framework have prompted economists to caution
politicians and administrators, "to discern this confusion behind the
impressive facade that benefit-cost practitioners have been building
the last twenty years.1
20
Because of such criticisms, agencies involved in developing wa-
ter resources have recently expanded the range of factors consid-
ered in cost-benefit determinations. On October 25, 1973, new
Principles and Standards for Planning Water and Related Re-
sources27 (hereinafter "Principles and Standards") went into ef-
VIEW OF PLANS FOR USE AND DEVELOPMENT OF WATER AND RELATED
LAND RESOURCES, S. Doc. No. 97, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962) [herein-
after cited as S. Doc. No. 97]. Such a criterion would theoretically
result in a more efficient allocation of resources if all economic prices
were reflected in the economy. But market imperfections such as
the concentration of monopoly power, external costs and the demand
for social goods prevent attainment of such an ideal economy. The
use of the single criterion of economic efficiency was thus of limited
practical value. See generally Note, Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra
note 18, at 1098-1101. In 1973, S. Doc. No. 97 was superseded by new
multiobjective standards for evaluating federally funded water re-
source projects. See notes 27-36 and accompanying text infra.
24. There are three possible standards to account for environmental
factors. First, adverse environmental effects could merely be de-
scribed. Second, they could be quantified in physical terms. E.g.,
in planning a new nuclear power plant, planners might need to evalu-
ate the physical effects of radiation and thermal discharges or the
aesthetic effects of cooling towers or transmission line towers. Third,
assuming one can develop such a physical inventory, true cost-benefit
analysis requires that these effects be translated into dollar values.
Note, Evolving Judicial Standards Under the National Environmental
Policy Act and the Challenge of the Alaska Pipeline, 81 YALE L.J.
1592, 1600 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Note, Evolving Judicial Stand-
ards]. While analysts have made inroads into the monetization
problem, the best available methods will produce only qualitative
statements concerning the environmental effects of resource projects.
See Joskow, Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 18, at 23-24; Note,
Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 18, at 1106-08.
25. Note, Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 18, at 1108-11.
26. Hammond, Convention and Limitation in Benefit-Cost Analysis, supra
note 18, at 219.
27. 38 Fed. Reg. 24778-869 (1973) [hereinafter cited as PRINCIPLES AND
STANDARDS]. These standards supersede S. Doc. No. 97, supra note
23. The multiobjective approach in the new standards is required by
the Flood Control Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 1962-2 (1970). For a
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fect, after being proposed by the Water Resources Council.28 These
Principles and Standards omit all references to cost-benefit ratios,
calling instead for the preparation of four "public information ac-
counts" evaluating a project's "beneficial and -adverse effects."29
The two principal accounts describe the effects of alternative plans
upon the main objectives of "national economic development" and
"environmental quality." Values for the national economic devel-
opment account are expressed in monetary terms, so that a net
benefit figure may still be computed.30 Values for the environ-
mental quality account may be expressed in quantitative or quali-
tative terms.3 ' Two additional accounts, "regional economic de-
velopment" and "social well-being," reflect secondary objectives
and may mix economic and qualitative evaluations. 32
While these new guidelines are an improvement over previous
cost-benefit standards, it is doubtful that they will effect substan-
tive changes in agency decisionmaking. By establishing more than
one criterion for project approval, the guidelines do force agencies
to articulate the trade-offs being made among the four objectives.3 3
critique of an earlier, proposed version of the standards, see Note,
Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 18, at 1111-15. -
28. The Water Resource Council derives its authority from the Water Re-
sources Planning Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1962a et seq. (1970). The
Council consists of representatives of the Departments of Agriculture,
Health, Education, and Welfare, Interior, and Transportation, the
Army Corps of Engineers and the Federal Power Commission with
participation from other interested agencies. PRINcIPLES AND STAND-
ARDS, supra note 27, at 24779.
29. PRINCIPLES AND STrA nDS, supra note 27, at 24787, 24833.
30. Id. at 24833.
31. Id. Concerning problems of measurement of environmental effects,
the new standards provide:
Whether subjectively perceived or objectively measured, the
criteria used to describe or evaluate the beneficial or adverse
effects of a plan will vary-consistent with the relevant com-
ponents of environmental quality under consideration. To
the extent possible, however, beneficial or adverse effects
will be displayed in terms of relevant physical and ecological
criteria or dimensions, including the appropriate qualitative
dimensions.
Id. at 24808.
32. Id. at 24816-20.
33. Before selecting a plan, a decisionmaker is required to make these
determinations:
1. The effectiveness of given alternative plans in meeting
the component needs of the objectives;
2. The differences among alternative plans in terms of
their contributions to the objectives and where appropriate
and their effects on regional development and social well-
being; and
3. The relative value of those beneficial and adverse ef-
fects that are essentially presented in nonmonetary terms, in
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The reasoning of the decisionmaker in choosing a particular plan
and his value judgment in selecting a particular mix of 'objectives
are thus opened to public scrutiny. On the other hand, the new
guidelines may only change the form of project justification, sup-
plementing the traditional monetary analysis of economic benefits
and costs with a narrative of other project effects. The Principles
and Standards provide, for example, that the "benefit-cost balance"
in the national economic development account must ordinarily be
greater than unity for the project to be approved.3 4  In addition,
the value of multiobjective analysis is limited because it is used
to test alternative plans for a given project, rather than to rank
,alternative projects.8 5 Finally, -the new guidelines are equally sus-
ceptible to the problems of agency abuse which have plagued tradi-
tional cost-benefit evaluations.
36
Since the new Principles and Standards are so closely related
to the cost-benefit analysis previously conducted by the water re-
source agencies, the remainder of this article employs the term
"cost-benefit analysis" to describe both the single and multiobjec-
ive approaches.
B. Political Considerations
Cost-benefit analysis has been developed in the evaluation of
water resource projects. As early as 1902, the Army Corps of En-
gineers was required to consider the commercial benefits and costs
of navigation projects it proposed to Congress.37 The Corps' pres-
terms of what is given up or traded off among plans with
varying degrees of contributions to the objectives.
PRINcIPLEs AND STANDARDS, supra note 27, at 24831.
After the screening process, the choice of a plan is "essentially a
choice governed by a reasonable and rational perception of priorities
and preferences about the mix of objectives. . . . The basis of se-
lection will be fully reported upon indicating all considerations made
in the selection process." Id. at 24832.
34. A recommended plan must have net national economic devel-
opment benefits unless the deficiency in net benefits for the
national economic development objective is the result of bene-
fits foregone or additional costs incurred to serve the environ-
mental quality objective. In such cases, a plan with a less
than unity benefit-cost balance may be recommended as long
as the net deficit does not exceed the benefits foregone and
the additional costs incurred for the environmental quality
objective.
Id. at 24787, 24832 (same language).
35. See text accompanying note 43 infra.
36. See text accompanying note 42 infra.
37. River and Harbor Act of 1902, ch. 1079, 32 Stat. 372-73 (1902). Con-
gress explicitly called for cost-benefit computation in the River and
Harbor Act, ch. 252, 41 Stat. 1009-10 (1920).
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ent responsibilities for cost-benefit analysis were first set out in
the Flood Control Act of 1936:
[I] t is the sense of Congress. . that the Federal Government
should improve or participate in the improvement of navigable
waters or their tributaries, including watersheds thereof, for flood-
control purposes if the benefits to whomsoever they may accrue
are in excess of the estimated costs .... 38
Following passage of the 1936 Act, other agencies involved in water
resource development gradually incorporated cost-benefit studies
into their project justifications. To enhance net benefits, agencies
began experimenting with measurements of "indirect benefits" or
"intangible benefits."3 9  These practices prompted publication of
a series of documents intended to standardize federal cost-benefit
techniques.40 The most recent guidelines were described above.41
Although federal guidelines for cost-benefit analysis have
changed, consistent patterns of agency behavior have been appar-
ent. First, the inherently flexible cost-benefit techniques have of-
ten been manipulated by analysts to assure favorable project eval-
uations: "[T] here is serious doubt whether federal agencies can ob-
jectively evaluate projects they will later be asked to build. Numer-
ous examples of inflated benefit estimates, as well as double- and
38. 33 U.S.C. § 701a (1970) (emphasis added).
39. One commentator has described the attempted measurement of sec-
ondary benefits in this manner:
The Bureau of Reclamation in particular began to make play
with "secondary" or "indirect" benefits, evaluating such
things as the increased attendance to be expected at motion-
picture theaters in an area affected by a reclamation project(at a figure amounting to thirty-nine per cent of the expected
admission fees); a process which, carried to its logical conclu-
sion throughout the life of, say, a dam designed to last half
a century or more, has implications at which the mind bog-
gles. Several agencies evoked so-called intangible benefits,
such as those afforded by the provision of facilities for recre-
ation, and a variety of attempts were-and continue to be-
made to put some kind of dollar value on them.
Hammond, Convention and Limitation in Benefit-Cost Analysis, supra
note 18, at 197-98 (citation omitted). Under the new cost-benefit
guidelines, "secondary benefits" are included in the national economic
development account as "Increases in output resulting from external
economies." Even though the economic methodology is admittedly
undeveloped, agencies are urged to include as benefits any antici-
pated increases in productivity or output of firms related to direct
users of the project outputs. PRINCnPLES AD STANDARDS, supra note
27, at 24797, 24799. In addition, certain intangible benefits such as
recreation are given monetary values and treated as direct output
increases. Id. at 24803.
40. See, e.g., S. Doc. No. 97, supra note 23, which has since been replaced
by PRINcIPLEs AND STANDARDS, supra note 27.
41. PRINCIPLES AN STANDARDS, supra note 27.
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over-counting in government cost-benefit analyses, seem to justify
this skepticism. '42 Second, cost-benefit analysis has been used pri-
marily to weed out inefficient projects, rather than as a tool to
rank the desirability of demonstrably "efficient" projects. Political
considerations rather than economic efficiency dictate which proj-
ects an agency will recommend from among those with cost-benefit
ratios in excess of 1.0. Chief among the political determinants ap-
pears to 'be the need for regional economic development."
A third agency pattern has been the use of favorable cost-bene-
fit determinations as a selling point with Congress. For exam-
ple, a recent House report on a Mississippi River public works proj-
ect observed, "The very favorable 'benefit cost ratio indicates the
investment in the project is sound."44 While cost-benefit analysis
is not the only consideration leading to project approval, such an-
alysis is regarded by Congress, the public, and even the courts as
an objective evaluation of -a project's impact. In view of the theo-
retical shortcomings and potential for abuse, this reliance appears
to be misplaced. But in a decisionmaking environment flooded
with raw data, it is not surprising that agencies and Congress
would rely upon such indicators to justify project approval.
C. Legal Considerations
Prior to NEPA, federal courts consistently refused to review
42. Note, Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 18, at 1104, relying, inter alia,
on Carlin, The Grand Canyon Controversy: Lessons for Federal Cost-
Benefit Practices, 44 LAND EcoN. 219, 227 (1968), and Tarlock &
Tippy, The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968, 55 CoanELr. L. REV.
707, 708 (1970).
43. See Wildavsky, supra note 18, at 63; Note, Cost-Benefit Analysis,
supra note 18, at 1105-06.
44. H.R. REP. No. 1475, 92d Cong, 2d Sess. 28 (1972), quoted in Sierra
Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289, 1364 (S.D. Tex. 1973). Con-
versely, a marginally favorable ratio can be a stumbling block in
Congress. Nebraska's Norden Dam project, for example, encountered
opposition in the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs,
when it was revealed that the ratio of direct benefits to costs was
only 1.21 to 1, while the ratio of total benefits to costs was 1.53 to 1.
Hearing on O'Neill Unit, Mo. River Basin Project, Nebraska, Before
the Senate Subcomm. on Water and Power Resources of the Comm. on
Interior and Insular Affairs, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1972). Senator
Hatfield objected that this ratio of direct benefits to costs was com-
puted at a 3 percent interest rate and that the "project would not qual-
ify under the 5% percent, let alone the 7 percent" discount rate
contemplated by Congress. Id. at 33. Senator Anderson, a supporter
of the Norden Project, recalled that he had "pointed out at one time
Hoover Dam couldn't possibly be built on a cost-benefit ratio." Id.
Concerning the discount rate problem, see note 20 and accompanying
text supra.
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agency or Congressional use of cost-benefit analysis. In the lead-
ing case, Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy F. Atkinson Co.,45 the
United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a stat-
ute authorizing construction of a reservoir on the Red River in
Texas and Oklahoma. The Court said, "it [is not] for us to deter-
mine whether the resulting benefits to commerce as a result of
this particular exercise by Congress of the commerce power out-
weigh the costs of the undertaking. '46 The Court's reluctance to
scrutinize cost-benefit techniques was consistent with its general
policy against interference with decisions committed to Congres-
sional or agency discretion. Once the Court established that build-
ing the reservoir was a proper exercise of Congress' power to regu-
late commerce, the decision to build the reservoir was a question
of legislative policy, not constitutional law.47 Subsequent cases,
including some post-NEPA decisions, continued to regard cost-ben-
efit techniques as outside the range of judicial review.48
Without the stimulus of NEPA, federal courts probably would
not have questioned the position of judicial deference to agency
cost-benefit analysis set out in Oklahoma ex rel. Phillips v. Guy
F. Atkinson Co.49 Ironically, neither NEPA's language nor its leg-
islative history suggests that an agency must undertake cost-ben-
efit analysis in evaluating a project's environmental effects. In-
stead, the cost-benefit balancing requirement is a product of crea-
tive lawmaking by federal courts seeking to implement NEPA's
broad policies of environmental preservation. The next section an-
alyzes the wisdom and feasibility of requiring cost-benefit analysis
45. 313 U.S. 508 (1941).
46. Id. at 528.
47. Hence, the court dismissed plaintiffs' contention that the reservoir
project would not substantially reduce flooding with these comments:
For us to inquire whether this reservoir will effect a substan-
tial reduction in the lower Mississippi floods would be to ex-
ercise a legislative judgment based on a complexity of en-
gineering data. It is for Congress alone to decide whether
a particular project, by itself or as part of a more compre-
hensive scheme, will have such a beneficial effect on the ar-
teries of interstate commerce as to warrant it.
Id. at 527. The Court's refusal to analyze Congressional motives or
reasonableness in funding the project followed previous decisions in-
volving the Boulder Dam Project, Arizona v. California, 283 U.S. 423,
455-56 (1931), and the Wilson Dam, Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288,
329-30 (1936).
48. Yalobusha County v. Crawford, 165 F.2d 867, 868 (5th Cir. 1947);
United States v. West Virginia Power Co., 122 F.2d 733, 738 (4th Cir.
1941) cert. denied, 314 U.S. 683 (1941); for post-NEPA cases see
notes 120, 124 infra.
49. 313 U.S. 508, 527 (1941).
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in order to comply with NEPA, in light of the economic, political
and legal considerations described above.
III. NEPA'S COST-BENEFIT REQUIREMENT
A. The Statutory Requirements and Calvert Clifs"
NEPA establishes a national policy of environmental non-degra-
dation and restoration. ° Section 101(b) describes environmental
values which are to guide federal actions, including the right to
safe and aesthetic surroundings, attainment of the widest range
of beneficial uses of the environment without degradation, and
preservation of environmental diversity.51 Section 102 was added
to implement these policies by establishing operational require-
ments for federal agencies. 52  Subsection 102(2) (A) requires fed-
eral agencies to use a "systematic, interdisciplinary approach" in
planning and decisionmaking. Subsection 102 (2) (B) requires agen-
,cies to develop methods and procedures to ensure that unquantified
environmental values are considered -along with economic and tech-
nical factors. Subsection 102(2) (C) requires each federal official
responsible for proposing legislation or other major federal actions
significantly affecting the environment to prepare a detailed en-
vironmental impact statement.5 3 The law applies to all federal
agencies, regardless of whether they are required to consider
environmental effects in their decisionmaking prior to NEPA.54
50. See 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (a) (1970). For a summary of NEPA litigation,
see ANDERSON, supra note 14; Annot., 17 A.L.R. FED. 33 (1973).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b).
52. The history of section 102 is succinctly described in Note, Cost-Bene-
fit Analysis, supra note 18, at 1093-94; see also Hanks & Hanks, An
Environmental Bill of Rights: The Citizen Suit and the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 24 RuTG-s L. REV. 230 (1970).
53. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2) (A) - (C). For full text, see note 7 supra.
54. E.g., Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C.
Cir. 1971); SCRAP v. United States, 371 F. Supp. 1291, 1296-98 (D.D.C.
1974) (holding ICC ratemaking required EIS); see also Scientists'
Institute for Public Information, Inc. v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079 (D.C. Cir.
1973) (holding program of technological research on liquid metal
fast breeder reactors required EIS, because of potential long-term ef-
fects of wide-spread use of such reactors), noted, 87 HARv. L. BEv.
1050 (1974). On the impact of NEPA on policy-level decisionmaking,
see Strohbehn, NEPA's Impact on Federal Decisionmaking: Examples
of Noncompliance and Suggestions for Change, 4 ECOLOGY L.Q. 93
(1971). A case of particular interest in the cost-benefit area is Union
of Concerned Scientists v. AEC, 6 Env. Rep. Cas. 1705 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
The court there suggested that implementation of new performance
criteria in nuclear-plant licensing could be '"major federal action," re-
quiring a previously-licensed plant to reevaluate its environmental
cost-benefit ratio. Id. at 1713-14.
554 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 53, NO. 4 (1974)
Environmentalists and courts concerned with implementation of
NEPA soon recognized the close relationship between the analyses
required for NEPA compliance and those traditionally conducted
to justify resource development. Environmental Defense Fund v.
Corps of Engineers55 was among the first decisions to consider the
sufficiency of an agency's impact statement under section 102(2).
The District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas enjoined
the Corps of Engineers from further construction of the Gillham
Dam across the Cossatot River, pending preparation of an adequate
impact statement. Among the plaintiffs' criticisms was the de-
fendant officials' failure to comply with subsection 102 (2) (B),
because they had developed no procedures for incorporating en-
vironmental values into the cost-benefit analysis submitted under
Senate Document 97.56 The plaintiffs contended that the project
might have a benefit-cost ratio below 1.0, if all environmental costs
were given a monetary value. Although the court agreed that sub-
section 102 (2) (B) required quantification of environmental values,
it said such computations were not technically feasible. Therefore,
the court concluded it was sufficient for the Corps to include a
statement that environmental values could not be quantified at the
present time in its amended impact statement.57
While the Gillham Dam decision suggested agencies already
using cost-benefit analysis must quantify environmental factors in
monetary terms, Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee Inc. v.
AEC58 arguably imposed a requirement to conduct cost-benefit
analysis upon all federal agencies. In Calvert Cliffs' the Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia held AEC rules governing
construction permits and operating licenses for nuclear power
plants did not comply with NEPA's requirement to consider envi-
ronmental values at every stage of the decisionmaking process.59
The court sought to implement NEPA's broad mandate to consider
environmental values through the procedural requirements im-
posed upon federal agencies under subsections 102(2) (A) -(C). Re-
55. 325 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark. 1971) injunction vacated, 342 F. Supp.
1211 (E.D. Ark. 1972), aff'd, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
412 U.S. 931 (1973).
56. 325 F. Supp. at 757; S. Doc. No. 97, note 23 supra.
57. 325 F. Supp. at 758.
58. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
59. Petitioners challenged four procedural rules of the AEC adopted to
implement NEPA and specific application of the rules in the granting
of a construction permit for the Calvert Cliffs Nuclear Power Plant
in Maryland. Id. at 1116, n.14. The court held each of the rules to be
inadequate under NEPA, but did not review any single decision of
the AEC. Instead the proceedings were remanded to the AEC for
revision of the stricken rules. Id. at 1128-29.
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lying on subsections 102(2) (A) and (B), the court said federal
agencies must employ a "finely tuned and 'systematic' balancing
analysis" 60 in evaluating a project's environmental impact.
NEPA mandates a case-by-case balancing judgment on the part
of federal agencies. In each individual case, the particular eco-
nomic and technical benefits of planned action must be assessed
and then weighed against the environmental costs; alternatives
must be considered which would affect the balance of values ....
The point of the individualized balancing analysis is to ensure
that, with possible alterations, the optimally beneficial action is
finally taken.61
The ,fulcrum for the "case-by-case balancing" contemplated in Cal-
vert Cliffs' is the "detailed statement" which officials responsible
for projects are required to prepare under subsection 102(2) (C).
Calvert Cliffs' indicates this statement should cover, "the impact
of particular actions on the environment, the environmental costs
which might be avoided, and alternative measures which might al-
ter the cost-benefit equation.162
The major difficulty with Calvert Cliffs' is its failure to elabo-
rate on the type of balancing required under NEPA. This ambigu-
ity has prompted varying interpretations from iNEPA commenta-
tors. On the one hand, Calvert Cliffs' and the Gillham Dam deci-
sion were read to require the type of rigorous cost-benefit analysis
conducted in the water resource area.63 The contrary view is typ-
ified by the testimony of Frederick Anderson before the 1972 Sen-
ate hearings on NEPA:
Perhaps the court should have stated explicitly that it was not
advocating the wholesale importation into certain Federal deci-
sions of vigorous cost-benefit analysis, such as that which has
been developed for water resource projects. Thus it could have
conveyed the more common sense notion of "trading off' that it
had in mind.64
In the absence of a clear Congressional mandate, the task of de-
fining the role of cost-benefit analysis under NEPA has fallen to
federal courts and to the agencies.
60. Id. at 1113.
61. Id. at 1123.
62. Id. at 1114.
63. Note, Cost-Benefit Analysis, supra note 18, at 1097-98; see also, Note,
Evolving Judicial Standards, supra note 24, at 1600-01.
64. Joint Hearing on National Environmental Policy Act Before the Sen-
ate Comm. on Public Works & Senate Comm. on Interior and Insular
Affairs, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 442-43 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Joint
Hearing on NEPA]; See also, Comment, 2 ENv. L. REP. 10003 (1972).
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B. The Decisions Since Calvert Cliffs'
In a recent Fifth Circuit case, the Environmental Defense Fund
argued that section 102 (2) (B) of NEPA requires full quantification
of costs and benefits:
The claimed violation of subsection 102(2) (B) is based upon
the absence of any rational articulation of a "scheme of values"
for the economic, technical and environmental factors that were
considered in deciding to recommend the construction of this proj-
ect. Plaintiffs contend that without some established scale by
which to measure, no one can determine how benefits and detri-
ments within each of these broad general groupings were "traded
off' in reaching the decision to recommend construction. 65
Despite such contentions, federal courts have uniformly dismissed
the argument that NEPA mandates cost-benefit analysis in a proj-
ect's impact statement. Some courts have rejected the need for
cost-benefit analysis outright, while others have retained Calvert
Cliffs' ambiguous "balancing" language, without elaborating on the
method for comparing benefits and costs. Though rarely articu-
lated, there are sound policy reasons for opposing a requirement
that an agency conduct traditional cost-benefit analysis in prepar-
ing an impact statement. Instead, NEPA decisions provide the pro-
cedural and substantive contours for a "balancing" procedure dis-
tinct from the type of cost-benefit analysis conducted by water
resource agencies.
Federal courts have responded to the argument that NEPA
"balancing" equates with traditional cost-benefit analysis in a vari-
ety of ways. On occasion, they have had little patience with plain-
tiffs seeking to question agency cost-benefit determinations. In
Environmental Defense Fund v. Armstrong,66 for example, a Cali-
fornia district court flatly rejected the plaintiffs' attempts to se-
cure review of the Corps of Engineers' economic analysis for the
New Melones Dam project. The court indicated, "we find no re-
quirement in the NEPA that any such cost-benefit analysis be con-
ducted or included in the EIS."67 In Farwell v. Brinegar,68 the
plaintiffs unsuccessfully contended that NEPA required the De-
partment of Transportation to conduct a cost-benefit analysis for
a proposed highway segment. Although the court enjoined the
65. EDF v. Corps of Engineers, 492 F.2d 1123, 1133 (5th Cir. 1974).
66. 352 F. Supp. 50 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
67. Id. at 57. The court later reaffirmed this position. EDF v. Armstrong,
356 F. Supp. 131, 136 (N.D. Cal. 1973), affd, 487 F.2d 814 (9th Cir.).
Accord, Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Stamm, 4 Env.
L. Rep. 20463, 20468 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
68. 3 Env. L. Rep. 20881 (W.D. Wis. 1973).
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freeway construction because of deficiencies in the impact state-
ment, it dismissed the plaintiffs' cost-benefit contention: "NEPA
requires only that the EIS discuss and balance the environmental
costs and benefits of the proposed action and its alternatives."8' 9
According to these two courts, an agency need merely discuss pos-
sible adverse environmental effects in order to satisfy its responsi-
bilities on the impact statement.
Numerous other courts have relied on the Calvert Cliffs' balanc-
ing language without describing the type of balancing which agen-
cies are required to perform. A series of cases in the Eighth Cir-
cuit typifies this second approach. Among the first decisions to
consider the balancing requirement was an appeal of the Gillham
Dam dispute.70 Following the Corps of Engineers' submission of
a 200-page impact statement, the District C6urt for the Eastern
District of Arkansas dissolved its earlier injunction against further
construction of the Gillham Dam.7 1 The Eighth Circuit affirmed,
noting that in the impact statement, "[t]he economic benefits and
environmental impact of each alternative are developed in great
detail. '72 After holding the district court should have subjected
the EIS to substantive review on the merits, the Eighth Circuit
reviewed the record itself and concluded the statement was ade-
quate. The court said its review "necessitated a balancing on the
one hand, of the benefits to be derived from flood control, and
on the other, of the importance of a diversified environment." 73
While the decision offers no standards for future "balancing" deci-
sions, it does suggest Calvert Cliffs' requires a trading off of eco-
nomic and environmental factors, rather than formal monetary cal-
culations.
A month later, in Environmental Defense Fund v. Froehlke,74
the Eighth Circuit held an impact statement filed by the Corps
of Engineers for the Cache River channelization project was not
sufficiently detailed to meet the standards of NEPA. Because the
impact statement was "too vague, too general and too conclusion-
ary," it could not "form a basis for responsible evaluation and criti-
cism. ' '7 5 The court criticized the EIS for failing to discuss fully
69. 3 Env. L. Rep. at 20886.
70. EDF v. Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972). The lower
court's decision granting an injunction against construction of the
Gillham Dam is discussed in text accompanying notes 55-57 supra.
71. 342 F. Supp. 1211 (E.D. Ark. 1972), dissolving injunction issued, 325
F. Supp. 749 (1971).
72. 470 F.2d at 297.
73. Id. at 301.
74. 473 F.2d 346 (8th Cir. 1972).
75. Id. at 348.
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the alternatives to the proposed action as required by subsection
102(2) (C) (iii) and for omitting analysis of the costs and benefits
of delayed construction to acquire land to mitigate the loss of na-
tural resources. The court also rejected a claim that the Corps'
cost-benefit determinations under section 701a of the Flood Con-
trol Act7G were reviewable. However, it noted: "[T]he relief re-
quested by the plaintiffs under § 701a is partially available under
NEPA. To fully comply with NEPA, the Corps must reappraise
the costs and benefits of the project in light of the policies of en-
vironmental protection found in NEPA.' '77 Hence, the Cache River
court perceived NEPA cost-benefit review as entailing different
considerations from that traditionally conducted for water resource
projects. But once again the court offered no criteria to guide
future NEPA cost-benefit "reappraisals."
In a third case, involving a Corps statement for the Truman
Darn project in Missouri, the plaintiffs asked the district court to
make detailed findings of fact concerning the inadequacies of the
cost-benefit ratios. 78  Plaintiffs contended, inter alia, that "much
of the recreational and socio-economic discussion in the EIS is
without any scientific or factual basis. '79 The court did not agree
that substantive judicial review under NEPA extends to agency
cost-benefit analysis. Instead, it reasoned the primary purpose of
an impact statement is to alert decisionmakers to environmental
objections concerning the project. Critics should therefore con-
centrate on shaping the final impact statement.80  While an EIS
"must adequately state legitimate conflicting views in regard to
benefit-cost calculations . . . , [t]he ultimate resolution of benefit-
cost questions is for the decisionmakers rather than the courts."81
The court concluded the impact statement discussed cost-benefit
considerations sufficiently and refused to halt the project.
As the Truman Dam case demonstrates, courts in the Eighth
Circuit have a strong sense of what NEPA "cost-benefit balancing"
is not, but they have not yet explained what it is.8 2 There is agree-
ment that it should not involve traditional cost-benefit techniques.
76. 33 U.S.C. § 701a (1970). See text accompanying note 38 supra.
77. 473 F.2d at 356.
78. EDF v. Froehlke, 368 F. Supp. 231 (W.D. Mo. 1973), affd sub nom.
EDF v. Callaway, 497 F.2d 1340 (8th Cir. 1974).
79. 368 F. Supp. at 235.
79. Id. at 235.
80. Id. at 237-41.
81. Id. at 241.
82. See also Iowa Citizens v. Volpe, 487 F.2d 849, 851-52 (8th Cir. 1973);
Schicht v. Romney, 372 F. Supp. 1270 (E.D. Mo. 1974).
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But the lower courts' sole guidance has been the Cache River dic-
tum to "reappraise the costs and benefits of the project in light
of the policies of environmental protection found in NEPA."'' 8
Other appellate courts adopting substantive review have been
equally ambiguous on the question of how to review cost-benefit
balancing.84
C. NEPA Does Not Require Full Quantification
Although rarely articulated by the courts, there are strong rea-
sons for holding NEPA does not require cost-benefit quantification.
First, nothing in the history of NEPA or the Calvert Cliffs' decision
suggests either Congress or the Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia intended NEPA to require rigorous cost-benefit anal-
ysis. The legislative history of section 102 is meager with only
two references to the pivotal subsection 102(2) (B).85 These refer-
ences indicate Congress' concern that the systematic interdiscipli-
nary approach required in subsection 102(2) (A) be supplemented
with methodology to identify and evaluate the full costs-environ-
mental and non-environmental-of federal activities. The sole
mention of cost-benefit analysis in the legislative record was a dis-
cussion of the role -of the Council on Environmental Quality, cre-
ated by another section of NEPA.86 "[S]ubsection (B) cannot be
fairly read to command an agency to develop or define any general
or specific quantification process. 87 Instead, this subsection calls
83. 473 F.2d at 356.
84. See cases cited note 17 supra.
85. The history of section 102 is described in Note, Cost-Benefit Analysis,
supra note 18, at 1093-94. The author points out subsection 102(2) (B)
is mentioned only twice in the committee reports and Congressional
Record. Id., n.19.
86. The passage concerned the way in which the CEQ might monitor
environmental values:
One way in which this might be done would be to develop
a sophisticated method of cost and benefit analysis-in which
the total (and often not strictly economic) consequences of
Federal activities may be assessed. The environmental au-
diting function of the Council falls squarely within the func-
tions specified in this subsection.
H.R. REP. No. 378, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1969). The CEQ was
created by Title II of NEPA, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4341-47 (1970).
87. EDF v. Corps of Engineers, 492 F.2d 1123, 1133 (5th Cir. 1974). The
court reasoned:
The provisions of subsection (B) requiring the agency af-
fected to "identify and develop methods and procedures" to
insure that the environmental qualities are "given appropri-
ate consideration along with economic and technical consider-
ations," order no more than that an agency search out, de-
velop and follow procedures reasonably calculated to bring
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only for the development of methods and procedures to assure that
environmental values are considered at every stage in the agency
decisionmaking process.
The Calvert Cliffs' decision is consistent with this interpreta-
tion. Calvert Cliffs' was the culmination of a series of decisions
requiring federal agencies to balance environmental factors against
the economic and technical factors they have traditionally
weighed.8 8 Thus, previous federal cases had required the Federal
Power Commission to "consider" environmental effects under a
provision of the Federal Power Act.8 9 In Calvert Cliffs', the term
"balancing" is used synonymously with the "consideration" of en-
vironmental impact required by section 102(2) (B). The Calvert
Cliffs' "balancing" language should therefore fairly be read as in-
corporating into NEPA the previous decisions' notion of "consider-
ing" or "trading off'" environmental and non-environmental ef-
fects.9 0
A second reason for not requiring cost-benefit quantification is
the difficulty of quantifying environmental amenities and values.
From the beginning, agency and industry leaders have expressed
the belief that a literal reading of the Calvert Cliffs' cost-benefit
balancing requirement would impose an impossible burden.9 1 En-
vironmental effects of projects have historically been the most dif-
ficult to describe in quantitative, let alone monetary, terms. 92
Courts have therefore been justified in rejecting environmentalists'
demands for quantification of all values weighed in a decision to
environmental factors to peer status with dollars and tech-
nology in their decision making.
Id.
88. See Comment, 2 Env. L. Rep. 10003 (1972), and testimony of Fred-
erick Anderson, Joint Hearing on NEPA, supra note 64, at 442-43.
89. Udall v. FPC, 387 U.S. 428 (1967); Scenic Hudson Preservation Con-
ference v. FPC, 354 F.2d 608, 620-24 (1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 941
(1966).
90. Cf. Cape Henry Bird Club v. Laird, 359 F. Supp. 404, 413 (W.D. Va.
1973):
The method of determining B/C ratios under NEPA is much
broader than under Senate Document No. 97. Costs which a
court might determine should be included in the NEPA stand-
ards, might not be included under the Congressional stand-
ards of Senate Document No. 97 .... [T]he NEPA B/C ra-
tio, rather than itself being the determining or deciding factor
in cases brought under NEPA, is to be used only to enable
the court and other decision makers to determine whether
all environmental factors of a project have been given full
and adequate consideration.
91. See, e.g., testimony of John Nassikas, Federal Power Commission
Chairman, Joint Hearing on NEPA, supra note 64, at 387.
92. See note 24 and accompanying text supra.
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proceed with a project. In examining the adequacy of an EIS filed
by the Corps of Engineers for its Tennessee-Tombigbee navigation
project, a MVississippi district court denied plaintiffs' contention
that computer analysis of costs and benefits should be included
in the impact statement:
[M]ethods and procedures ... are sufficient if they do effec-
tively measure life's amenities in terms of the present state of the
art. Although computers may some day be used to quantify eco-
logical elements more precisely, . . . a valid ecosystems analysis
may be achieved by an interdisciplinary team of scientists con-
ducting a rigorous examination of the area affected by the pro-ject.93
In affirming this decision, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Cir-
cuit said of subsection 102(2) (B):
Plaintiffs concede that compliance with this subsection does not
require that every environmental amenity be reduced to an inte-
ger capable of insertion in a "go-no go" equation. They must
further acknowledge that many environmental values cannot be
fixed within a given project area, and that others are bound to
vary in value from place to place and time to time.9 4
Third, cost-benefit calculations should not be required for
NEPA compliance because this would invite agencies to use the
EIS for project justification, rather than for evaluation of poten-
tially adverse environmental impacts. If Calvert Cliffs' requires
rigorous balancing 'of environmental, technical and economic con-
siderations in an impact statement, agencies will be tempted to load
up the statements with developmental benefits. This clearly con-
tradicts the Congressional intention that the EIS involve a factual
analysis of environmental costs and benefits. Of course, some dis-
cussion of the economic and technical benefits is necessary in order
to acquaint EIS readers with the project. But a complete quantita-
tive explanation of the balancing decision would distract the
agency and the statement commentators from their environmental
auditing duties.95
93. EDF v. Corps of Engineers, 348 F. Supp. 916, 928 (N.D. Miss. 1972).
94. EDF v. Corps of Engineers, 492 F.2d 1123, 1133 (5th Cir. 1974). The
absence of methods to quantify environmental values has often been
used by courts to fend off plaintiffs demanding more rigorous cost-
benefit analysis. According to one such court, "[a]t present there
does not appear to be any method of calculating such values, nor do
the plaintiffs offer any suggestions to resolve the problem. All that
the EIS need do to comply with NEPA is to note that such a defi-
ciency exists." Cape Henry Bird Club v. Laird, 359 F. Supp. 404, 414(W.D. Va. 1973), relying on EDF v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp.
749, 758 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
95. A closely related issue is whether the EIS should serve as the entire
decision document or as one component of the record which an agency
562 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 53, NO. 4 (1974)
Finally, reducing the agency decision to a single calculation or
calculations would add an unnecessary distortion to the decision-
making process by implying that a project decision can be com-
pletely rational. In reality, any government decision to commit
resources to further a policy goal involves a trading off of tangible
and intangible considerations.96 The purpose of an EIS is to high-
light environmental values which were previously invisible to
agency decisionmakers and make explicit the trade-offs involved.
To require precise estimates of costs and benefits would invite the
considers in project approval. As Frederick Anderson points out,
this question is especially troublesome in the cost-benefit area. Re-
quiring cost-benefit analysis in an EIS would open it to judicial re-
view, but it would also overshadow the mandated environmental
analysis. ANDERSON, supra note 14, at 254-58. Anderson has since
suggested a "compromise" which preserves the advantages of both
views:
First, an impact statement that discusses alternatives-a key
NEPA requirement-without analyzing all important costs
and benefits would certainly be inadequate. The discussion
of alternatives must be wide-ranging if the statement is to
be at all meaningful. Second, brief reference in the state-
ment to developmental benefits would not be offensive, to
the extent the reference is necessary to make the environ-
mental analysis intelligible to readers of the statement who
are not familiar with the project.
Comment, The National Environmental Policy Act: How It Is Work-
ing, How It Should Work, 4 Env. L. Ren. 10003, 10006 (1974).
96. One commentator has said of Calvert Cliffs' balancing test:
If all the language means is that the decisionmakers must
consider the broadest alternatives in doing the best job they
can, massing the most information, and consider it all, all
to the good. But if it means the result has to be totally ra-
tional, that each agency has to make every governmental de-
cision in accord with the strict dictates of the scientific
method, then again it is requiring the impossible.
Roger C. Cramton, Joint Hearing on NEPA, supra note 64, at 395.
Cramton, chairman of the Administrative Conference of the United
States, stressed the role of political compromise, intuition and ac-
commodation in decisionmaking.
We may ultimately have armies of economists, statisticians,
systems analysts who consider the alternatives and try to de-
velop information on them. But once you determine as accu-
rately as you can, what the effects will be on fish and wild-
life, and what benefits will be gained by the project, it is
fundamentally a political judgment about what is the social
good, what is the best outcome, and on that . . . the politi-
cians ... have the final decisions.
Id. at 400. Cramton's conclusion that decisionmaking should be left
to the agencies does not necessarily follow from these premises. If
agencies are unwilling or unable to weigh the full gamut of competing
considerations, the courts are well-situated to provide limited sub-
stantive review.
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same type of agency manipulation already prevalent in the water
resource field.97
D. Standards for NEPA "Cost-Benefit Balancing"
The Calvert Cliffs' balancing requirement requires an explicit,
well-reasoned and fully-documented "trading off" of environmen-
tal, economic and technical values in a project EIS. Thus far, fed-
eral courts have been primarily concerned with the procedural re-
quirements for "NEPA cost-benefit analysis." If NEPA is to have
its intended effect in altering agency's decisions which affect the
environment, courts must begin to elaborate standards for substan-
tive review of balancing decisions.
1. Procedural Standards
Courts have developed three general principles governing dis-
cussion of costs and benefits in the impact statement. First, ju-
dicial interpretation indicates an EIS must present all of the en-
vironmental data necessary to make a reasoned judgment on a
project.98 In addition to the contemplated action, NEPA requires
elaboration of the environmental risks incident to all reasonable
alternatives, including any alternatives which may be outside the
agency's specific authority.99 In preparing the EIS, agencies must
follow the procedural mandates of sections 102(2) (A) and 102(2)
97. See note 42 and accompanying text supra.
98. The major legal issue under subsection 102(2) (C) is the proper in-
terpretation of the requirement that an impact statement be "de-
tailed." For a comparison of various judicial tests, see Sierra Club v.
Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289, 1341-42 (S.D. Tex. 1973) (EIS must dis-
cuss "all possible significant effects on the environment"). One court
has said the detail required is, "that which is sufficient to enable
those who did not have a part in its compilation to understand and
consider meaningfully the factors involved." EDF v. Corps of En-
gineers, 492 F.2d 1123, 1136 (5th Cir. 1974). Cf., Natural Resources
Defense Council v. TVA, 367 F. Supp. 128, 133 (E.D. Tenn. 1973)(EIS need not discuss environmental costs and benefits where topic
"permeates the entire document").
99. Natural Resources Defense Council v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 834 (D.C.
Cir. 1972). See ANDERSON, supra note 14, at 217-21; Jordan, Alterna-
tives Under NEPA: Toward an Accomodation, 3 EcoLoGY L.Q. 705(1973). See also 1-29 Why? Ass'n v. Burns, 372 F. Supp. 223, 247-53
(D. Conn. 1974); Farwell v. Brinegar, 3 Env. L. Rep. 20881, 20884-85
(W.D. Wis. 1973); EDF v. TVA, 371 F. Supp. 1004, 1011-12 (E.D. Tenn.
1973); Montgomery v. Ellis, 364 F. Supp. 517, 523-26 (N.D. Ala.
1973); Burleigh v. Calloway, 362 F. Supp. 121, 123 (D. Hawaii 1973);
Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289, 1343-45, 1353-56 (S.D. Tex.
1973).
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(B). That is, they must utilize an interdisciplinary approach' 0
and attempt to develop methods and procedures which give appro-
priate values to "previously unquantified environmental ameni-
ties."'101
Second, an EIS must include some discussion of the economic
and technical considerations 'associated with each alternative. Mere
conclusory statements about the economic benefits of a certain al-
ternative are not enough. 10 2  The rationale for this requirement
was described in a decision enjoining the TVA's construction of
the Tellico Dam in Tennessee:
Although comprehensive in scope, the draft statement's cost-bene-
fit analysis consists almost entirely of unsupported conclusions.
As a result a non-expert reader is denied the opportunity to in-
telligently evaluate TVA's conclusions. In addition, it is impos-
sible to determine the thoroughness of the research upon which
TVA based the conclusions, or the relative merit.103
While the EIS should not 'be the agency's basic decisionmaking doc-
ument, it should reveal the basis for the trade-offs to agencies and
individuals to whom it is circulated. 0 4
100. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109,
1113-14 (D.C. Cir. 1971); EDF v. Corps of Engineers, 348 F. Supp. 916,
927-31 (N.D. Miss. 1972); EDF v. Hardin, 325 F. Supp. 1401, 1403
(D.D.C. 1971); See also Lathan v. Volpe, 350 F. Supp. 262, 266 (W.D.
Wash. 1972).
101. EDF v. Corps of Engineers, 492 F.2d 1123, 1133-34 (5th Cir. 1974),
aff'g 348 F. Supp. 916, 927-31 (N.D. Miss. 1972); Calvert Cliffs' Co-
ordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1113-14 (D.C. Cir.
1971); Akers v. Resor, 3 Env. L. Rep. 20157, 20158 (W.D. Tenn. 1972);
cf. Hanly v. Kleindienst, 471 F.2d 823, 835 (2d Cir. 1972).
102. Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282, 1285-87 (1st Cir. 1973); EDF v. Froehlke,
473 F.2d 346, 348 (8th Cir. 1972); Conservation Soc'y of S. Vt. Inc. v.
Secretary of Transp., 362 F. Supp. 627, 635-38 (D. Vt. 1973); Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Grant, 355 F. Supp. 280, 287
(E.D.N.C. 1973); Daly v. Volpe, 350 F. Supp. 252, 259 (W.D. Wash.
1972); Lathan v. Volpe, 350 F. Supp. 262, 266 (W.D. Wash. 1972);
Brooks v. Volpe, 350 F. Supp. 269, 277-78 (W.D. Wash. 1972); EDF
v. TVA, 339 F. Supp. 806, 809 (E.D. Tenn. 1972); see Duck River Pres-
ervation Ass'n v. TVA, 6 Env. Rep. Cas. 1789 (E.D. Tenn. 1974).
103. EDF v. TVA, 339 F. Supp. 806, 809 (E.D. Tenn. 1972).
104. The agency must also "explicate fully its course of inquiry,
its analysis and its reasoning." Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130,
1139 (4th Cir. 1971). Thus, the complete formal impact study
represents an accessible means for opening up the agency de-
cision-making process and subjecting it to critical evaluation
by those outside the agency, including the public.
EDF v. Corps of Engineers, 473 F.2d 346, 351 (8th Cir. 1972); see
Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d 1282, 1284-85 (1st Cir. 1973); Chemical Lea-
man Tank Lines, Inc. v. United States, 368 F. Supp. 925, 947-49 (D.
el. 1973). But see Sax, The (Unhappy) Truth About NEPA, 26
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The scope of the requirement to summarize economic consider-
ations in the EIS is underscored 'by SCRAP v. United States.0 5
Plaintiffs sought a declaration that the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission had failed to comply with NEPA in authorizing railroad
rate increases on shipments of recyclable commodities. The court,
speaking through Judge J. Skelly Wright, held the EIS to be in-
sufficient because it failed to present a rigorous analysis justifying
the disparities 'between rates charged for primary and secondary
(recyclable) materials. The court required a new statement in-
cluding an analysis of the rate structure's impact on the movement
of recyclable commodities.1 6 The SCRAP opinion perceived that
the agency's duty to quantify values in the decisionmaking process
to the extent feasible extends to non-environmental values under
consideration.
As a third basic principle, courts have required water resource
agencies developing cost-benefit ratios for other purposes to in-
clude and explain the ratios in the impact statement.10 7 This is
necessary, since the cost-benefit ratios do play a significant role
in a final agency determination. As one court explained, "if the
purpose of an EIS is to advise Congress of -all environmental con-
sequences of a proposed action, then the EIS should contain a sec-
tion which first explains how the benefits and costs are calculated,
and then detail what items are included as a benefit or a cost and
the valuation of each."' 08 To avoid making the benefit-cost ratio
the focal point of the EIS, it may be summarized and attached
to the statement. In addition, courts have required agencies to
include legitimately conflicting views concerning the cost-benefit
calculations in the final EIS submitted with a project.'09
OKmA. L. REv. 239 (1973): 'I know of no solid evidence to support
the belief that requiring articulation, detailed findings or reasoned
opinions enhances the integrity or propriety of administrative de-
cisions."
105. 371 F. Supp. 1291 (D.D.C. 1974).
106. Id. at 1301-06.
107. Montgomery v. Ellis, 364 F. Supp. 517, 521-22 (N.D. Ala. 1973); Si-
erra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289, 1365-67 (S.D. Tex. 1973);
Cape Henry Bird Club v. Laird, 359 F. Supp. 404, 414 (W.D. Va. 1973);
EDF v. TVA, 339 F. Supp. 806, 809 (E.D. Tenn. 1972), injunction dis-
solved, 371 F. Supp. 1004, 1010 (1973). Contra, McPhail v. Corps of
Engineers, 3 Env. L. Rep. 20237, 20239 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
108. Cape Henry Bird Club v. Laird, 359 F. Supp. 404, 414 (W.D. Va.
1973).
109. EDF v. Froehlke, 368 F. Supp. 231, 241 (W.D. Mo. 1973); Cape Henry
Bird Club v. Laird, 359 F. Supp. 404, 420 (E.D. Va. 1973); see also
Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783, 787
(D.C. Cir. 1971); McPhail v. Corps of Engineers, 3 Env. L. Rep.
20237, 20239 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
566 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW-VOL. 53, NO. 4 (1974)
These judicial standards for the balancing decision have also
been recommended by the Council on Environmental Quality
("CEQ"), in its guidelines for federal agencies under NEPA.1 10
Initially, in response to Calvert Cliffs', the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion ("AEC") had adopted regulations and supplemental guidelines
which called for a more rigorous, quantitative balancing of costs
and benefits."' The AEC's willingness to comply with the deci-
sion was laudatory, but its rigid interpretation of the "cost-benefit"
requirement did little to advance the goals of NEPA." 2 The CEQ
never accepted this reading of Calvert Cliffs'.11  Instead, the
guidelines it adopted after two years of study concentrate on iden-
tification of environmental impacts and description of the basic
"trade-off" decisions." 4 Although some agencies continue to ex-
110. Council on Environmental Quality, Preparation of Environmental Im-
pact Statements: Guidelines, 38 Fed. Reg. 20550 (1973), to be codified
at 40 C.F.R., pt. 1500.
111. 10 C.F.R. § 50.110, app. D, p. 300 (1974). These regulations have since
been revised. See Atomic Energy Commission, Environmental State-
ments-Operations, 39 Fed. Reg. 5620 (1974).
112. One Calvert Cliffs' commentator observed:
The Commission's concept of cost-benefit analysis does lit-
tle to further the objectives of NEPA, which was intended
to induce the analysis of second order, longer-range conse-
quences of decision making. The issue in power plant siting
conflicts is seldom the loss of a commercial fishery, although
that is important. The more significant question is whether
the plant will cause the long-term deterioration of an ecosys-
tem and thus threaten our basic life support systems, and
the AEC's proposed cost-benefit guidelines do little to en-
courage consideration of these questions.
Tarlock, Balancing Environmental Considerations and Energy De-
mands: A Comment on Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc.
v. AEC, 47 IND. L.J. 645, 675-76 (1972).
113. In the Senate hearing on Calvert Cliffs', CEQ Chairman Russell
Train cautiously assessed the AEC response:
We view the provision for a cost-benefit type analysis in the
new AEC NEPA procedures as being responsive not only to
the court's decision but also relevant to the provision in sec-
tion 102(2) (B) .... At the same time, we do not propose
now that these AEC procedures be applied across the board
to all proposed Federal programs and actions. We see NEPA
as permitting flexibility as to how the assessment of the eco-
nomic and technical benefits of proposed action takes place
and is evidenced. We will want evidence that such benefits
have been weighed against the environmental costs and that
a reasonable range of alternatives that would affect this bal-
ance has been considered. But as to just how this is done
and which parts are shown in the section 102(2) (C) environ-
mental impact statement is a matter still under study.
Hearing on the Calvert Cliffs' Court Decision Before the Senate
Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 92d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1,
at 24 (1971).
114. For required contents of impact statements under the CEQ guide-
lines, see 38 Fed. Reg. 20553-54 (1973).
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periment with additional cost-benefit evaluations, most now follow
the CEQ recommended format.11 5
2. Substantive standards
While the above criteria help define the NEPA balancing proc-
ess, they do not assure that the trade-offs will lead to changes
in substantive agency decisions. An agency may formally follow
all of the balancing procedures and still arrive at an ecologically
unsound conclusion. For this reason, courts must be willing to
review NEPA cost-benefit balancing on the merits, once procedural
requirements have been satisfied. A number of courts have held
NEPA does mandate a limited form of substantive review,1 16 but
they have not yet identified the sources of enforceable rights under
NEPA. One commentator 117 has suggested that agency determina-
tions might be measured against the following standards: (1) the
policy goals set out in NEPA's section 101;1"s (2) agency objectiv-
ity;" 9 and (3) the accuracy of an agency's cost-benefit analysis
for non-NEPA purposes.
The next section discusses whether the last-cited factor-an
115. See, e.g., Soil Conservation Service, Preparation of Environmental
Impact Statements-Guidelines, 39 Fed. Reg. 19646 (1974); Corps of
Engineers, Administrative Procedure: Environmental Impact State-
ments, 39 Fed. Reg. 12737 (1974). The CEQ guidelines are advisory
only, since the Council does not have the authority to promulgate
regulations governing NEPA compliance. See Wyoming Outdoor Co-
ordinating Council v. Butz, 359 F. Supp. 1178, 1184 (D. Wyo. 1973).
Justice Douglas suggests that an adverse recommendation by the CEQ
is "entitled to great weight" in reviewing the agency decision process.
Warm Springs Task Force v. Gribble, 94 S. Ct. 2542, 2547 (Douglas,
Circuit Justice, 1974).
116. See cases cited note 17 supra.
117. Note, Substantive Review, supra note 16.
118. Section 101 (b) directs agencies to improve programs so that the na-
tion will fulfill its responsibilities as trustee of the environment for
succeeding generations; assure Americans of safe, healthful and pleas-
ing surroundings; attain the widest range of environmental benefits
without degradation; preserve the national heritage and promote
diversity; achieve a balance between population and resource use;
and promote recycling of materials. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1970).
The Note argues these goals are sufficiently concrete to provide en-
forceable standards. Note, Substantive Review, supra note 16 at
190-94. See also Arnold, The Substantive Right to Environmental
Quality Under the National Environmental Policy Act, 3 Env. L.
Rep. 50028 (1973).
119. Agency bias or bad faith in considering an EIS will invalidate the
decision. D.C. Federation v. Volpe, 459 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1030 (1972). See Note, Substantive Review,
supra note 16, at 194-99.
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agency's cost-benefit analysis for purposes other than the impact
statement-should be subject to substantive review under NEPA.
This Comment has thus far shown NEPA does not require agencies
outside the water resources field to undertake cost-benefit analysis.
It does not necessarily follow, however, that cost-benefit analysis
conducted by water resouce agencies for other purposes should be
immune from judicial scrutiny under NEPA. Part IV, then, anal-
yzes the narrow question of whether the cost-benefit analysis con-
ducted by water resource agencies should be included in a NEPA
review.
IV. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF NON-NEPA
COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS
A. The Conventional Wisdom
Environmental groups have often argued that the Calvert
Cliffs' balancing requirement necessitates judicial review of agency
cost-benefit analysis conducted by water resource agencies. Few
courts have been receptive to this idea. In preliminary proceed-
ings in the Gillham Dam case,120 the Environmental Defense Fund
urged judicial scrutiny of economic calculations conducted under
the mandate of section 701a of the Flood Control Act of 1936.121 The
court rejected this contention on two grounds. First, since Con-
gress had already appropriated money for the project, the court
said it lacked the authority to enjoin expenditure of the funds.1 22
Second, in language reminiscent of pre-NEPA cases, the court re-
garded the calculation of cost-benefit ratios as a legislative, rather
than a judicial, function: "The methods of calculating cost-benefit
ratios are innumerable and in many cases esoteric. The Court's
judgment as to sound procedures in this regard might well not
be in accord with the judgment of Congress."'12-3 This rationale
has been generally repeated by other federal courts without fur-
ther elaboration. 24
120. EDF v. Corps of Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 728 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
121. 33 U.S.C. § 701a (1970). See text accompanying note 38 supra.
122. 325 F. Supp. at 740.
123. Id.
124. EDF v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346, 356 (8th Cir. 1972); EDF v. TVA, 371
F. Supp. 1004, 1014 (E.D. Tenn. 1973), affd per curiam, 492 F.2d 466(5th Cir. 1974); EDF v. Froehlke, 368 F. Supp. 231, 240-41 (W.D. Mo.
1973); Cape Henry Bird Club v. Laird, 359 F. Supp. 404, 413 (W.D.
Va. 1973), affd per curiam, 484 F.2d 453 (4th Cir.); EDF v. Arm-
strong, 352 F. Supp. 50, 57 (N.D. Cal. 1972), affd, 487 F.2d 814(7th
Cir. 1973); EDF v. Corps of Engineers, 348 F. Supp. 916, 924 (N.D.
Miss. 1972), affd, 492 F.2d 1123 (5th Cir. 1974); Sierra Club v.
Froehlke, 345 F. Supp. 440, 446-47 (W.D. Wis. 1972), affd, 486 F.2d
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Even where substantive review of NEPA decisions has been un-
dertaken, courts have sought to distinguish the full review of cost-
benefit ratios sought by plaintiffs from the "partial review" avail-
able under NEPA. In Environmental Defense Fund v. TVA, 125 for
example, the plaintiffs called two expert witnesses who testified
about the inadequacies of cost-benefit calculations prepared by the
Corps of Engineers for the Tellico Dam project. The testimony
was that the claimed navigation and flood control benefits, the dis-
count rate, the project life and the secondary benefits were all
arbitrarily determined. 26 While the court reviewed on the merits
the decision to proceed, it refused to review these economic factors.
Instead, the court adopted the Cache River formulation 7 that sub-
stantive review entails only reappraisal of "the costs and benefits
of the project in light of the policies of environmental protection
found in NEPA." 28 In the Tellico Dam case, the court reasoned
it should scrutinize only environmental benefits claimed by an
agency in determining whether the NEPA balance struck was arbi-
trary or capricious.129
The Cache River dictum has also been interpreted as supplant-
ing any review rights created under section 701a. In affirming
a favorable review of an EIS filed for the Tennessee-Tombigbee
Waterway project, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
agreed with the Cache River court that NEPA created an independ-
ent duty to reappraise costs and benefits.8 0 The court reasoned
that since "NEPA requires a more comprehensive and pervasive
weighing of costs and benefits than Section 701a contemplates,
whatever rights may exist under that statute have been subsumed
by NEPA insofar as our review of the Tennessee-Tombigbee proj-
ect is concerned."' 1
B. The Case for Judicial Review
The traditional justifications for avoiding cost-benefit review do
946 (7th Cir. 1973); Conservation Council of North Carolina v. Froe-
hlke, 340 F. Supp. 222, 226-27 (M.D.N.C. 1972), rev'd on other grounds,
473 F.2d 664 (4th Cir. 1973).
125. 371 F. Supp. 1004 (E.D. Tenn. 1973).
126. Id. at 1013-14.
127. EDF v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346 (8th Cir. 1972); see text accompany-
ing notes 74-77 supra.
128. 473 F.2d at 356.
129. 371 F. Supp. at 1014.
130. EDF v. Corps of Engineers, 492 F.2d 1123, 1134 (5th Cir. 1974).
131. Id. Since no court has ever held that section 701a creates "review
rights," it is misleading to suggest that such hypothetical rights are
supplanted by a substantive NEPA review.
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not withstand close analysis. First, it is not correct that a deci-
sion by Congress to authorize or appropriate money for a project
immunizes it from judicial review. In Cache River, the Corps of
Engineers conceded that limited substantive review on the merits
is generally available, but argued such review was inappropriate
because Congress had authorized the project in 1950 and appropri-
ated money after the EIS was filed.13 2 The court rejected this
argument calling attention to congressional rules which provide
that an appropriations act cannot alter existing law.3 3  Therefore,
unless Congress enacted a revised authorization bill exempting the
project from NEPA's requirements, the appropriation bill could not
override NEPA's substantive provisions. 3 4
Courts could use similar reasoning to reach agency cost-benefit
analyses, since further funding of a project is contingent, in part,
on a favorable cost-benefit determination. NEPA requires full
consideration of environmental values in the agency decision proc-
ess, including cost-benefit evaluations. Since Congress cannot use
an appropriation bill to alter the substantive requirements of
NEPA, courts should be able to enjoin further Congressional fund-
132. EDF v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346, 353 (8th Cir. 1972).
133. Rule XXI of the House of Representatives, concerning appropriations
bills, provides that no "provision in any such bill or amendment
thereto changing existing law [shall] be in order .... ." L. DESCH-
LER, MANUAL AND RULES OF HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 92d Cong.,
H.R. Doc. No. 439, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 464-65 (1971). Rule 16.4 of the
Standing Rules of the Senate contains an analogous provision con-
cerning amendments to appropriations bills. G. HARRISON & J. CODER,
SENATE MANUAL, S. Doc. No. 92-1, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 18 (1971). The
difference between the House and Senate rules apparently results
from the House's power to originate appropriations bills. 473 F.2d
at 354 n.19.
134. 473 F.2d at 355. The Cache River court relied on Committee for
Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783, 785 (D.C. Cir. 1971),
which considered the sufficiency of an EIS filed in connection with
the underground nuclear test on Amchitka Island, Alaska. Congress
had passed the authorization and appropriations bills after NEPA.
The court held Congress could not repeal NEPA by implication. Al-
though there was discussion of the impact statement in the legislative
history, "Congress did not purport to make a binding determina-
tion on the issue whether the statement was in compliance with
NEPA." Id. at 786. The Cache River holding was narrower, since
that project had been authorized prior to enactment of NEPA. See
also EDF v. TVA, 468 F.2d 1164, 1182 (6th Cir. 1972); Ohio v. Calla-
way, 364 F. Supp. 296, 297 n.1 (S.D. Ohio 1973); EDP v. Corps of
Engineers, 325 F. Supp. 749, 762-63 (E.D. Ark. 1971); cf., note 150
infra. But cf., Friends of the Earth v. Armstrong, 485 F.2d 1 (10th
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 94 S. Ct. 933 (1974), noted 54 B.U.L. REv.
457 (1974).
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ing based upon cost-benefit calculations which are arbitrary or give
insufficient weight to environmental factors.135
A second, closely related objection to judicial review is that
cost-benefit analysis is peculiarly a "legislative function.' u 6 Two
recent federal decisions have identified the fallacies in this argu-
ment. They reflect the growing judicial interest in overseeing ad-
ministrative procedures and in implementing the broad policy goals
which underlie NEPA. The plaintiffs in Sierra Club v. Froehlke'37
sought to enjoin construction of the Trinity project, involving con-
version of a 370-mile stretch of the Trinity River in Texas into
a barge canal, and the Wallisville project, involving construction
of a dam at the mouth of the Trinity River. At the time of the
suit, construction on the Wallisville project was 82 percent com-
plete, while the overall project was 72 percent done.138 Neverthe-
less, the District Court for the Southern District of Texas found
Wallisville to be a component of the Trinity project. It delayed
further construction pending completion, review and acceptance of
the Trinity EIS. 39 While this was sufficient to dispose of the case,
the court went on to evaluate the Wallisville EIS previously sub-
mitted. It said the-new impact statements for both projects would
need substantial revision to comply with existing legal require-
ments. 40
Despite its advisory nature, the court's discussion about the
project's cost-benefit ratios was the most penetrating judicial in-
135. In the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway case, the court said the cases
cited note 134 supra, permitting judicial review, held only that sub-
sequent legislative appropriations do not preclude review of the pro-
cedural sufficiency of impact statements. The court reasoned that
since Congress had already determined the waterway should be built,
it had become the ultimate decisionmaker and no further review was
available on the merits of the decision. EDF v. Corps of Engineers,
492 F.2d 1123, 1140-41 (5th Cir. 1974). One of the cases upon which
the Fifth Circuit relies, EDF v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 346 (8th Cir. 1972),
directly contradicts this interpretation. Further, if the premise is
correct that Congress cannot alter NEPA's requirements by an ap-
propriations bill, then it should not matter whether an agency rec-
ommendation is procedurally or substantively in error. Legislators
voting for an appropriations bill should be able to assume that a proj-
ect will be carried out under both the procedural and substantive
mandate of NEPA unless they specifically grant an exemption. Such
compliance includes full consideration of environmental values during
the agency cost-benefit analysis.
136. See note 123 and accompanying text supra.
137. 359 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
138. Id. at 1308-09.
139. Id. at 1331-32.
140. Id. at 1341-45, 1381-83.
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quiry yet into this form of economic analysis. The judge was par-
ticularly adept in clearing the hurdles which had previously
tripped courts faced with the problem. His analysis was premised
on a broad reading of NEPA's purpose: "protection of the environ-
ment is now viewed as paramount, and it is not to be placed on
an equal footing with the usual economic and technical factors.
u41
The court acknowledged that ultimate responsibility rested with
Congress but maintained NEPA requires courts to see that envi-
ronmental values are properly weighed throughout the decision
process.142 The cost-benefit analysis conducted under section 701a
accounted for environmental benefits but did not include environ-
mental costs. "The result is that the meaning of the benefit-cost
ratio, which is represented to the Congress, this Court and the pub-
lic as being an objective evaluation of all quantifiable factors in-
volved in these various projects, is open to considerable ques-
tion.' 43 The court was cognizant of the importance of a favorable
cost-benefit ratio to the decision of an agency or Congress to un-
dertake a project.144
Having correctly recognized NEPA's mandate for close judicial
scrutiny, the court had no difficulty with the argument that courts
should avoid consideration of cost-benefit theories because they are
multitudinous and esoteric. The court measured the specific cost-
benefit procedure employed by the Corps 145 against NEPA .and the
Corps' own NEPA regulations, 46 pointing out specific deficiencies
in the economic analysis as it impinged on environmental fac-
tors. 47 While the court admitted having some difficulty with this
task, its criticisms were aimed at the vague standards propounded
by Congress and the agencies, not at conflicting theories. 48  To
141. Id. at 1370.
142. Id. at 1365.
143. Id. at 1363.
144. Id. at 1363-64.
145. The Corps of Engineers' analysis was based upon S. Doc. No. 97,
supra note 23.
146. 37 Fed. Reg. 2525 (1972). These guidelines have since been revised.
See note 115 supra. The court also referred to the Corps of En-
gineers' published instructions for EIS preparation and proposed reg-
ulations for the Environmental Protection Agency to show the de-
gree of detail necessary for NEPA compliance. 359 F. Supp. at
1366-67.
147. 359 F. Supp. at 1367-81.
148. What is of deep concern is the absence of definitive guide-
lines, procedures and common denominator terms to be used
in quantifying and comparing environmental values with
other values. Such expertise should be found most readily




the extent that the court was seeking more specific guidance for
quanitfying environmental amenities, it was probably asking too
much of administrators. But even if environmental costs are not
quantifiable, the court recognized that agencies should not be able
to "load up" the highly visible benefit-cost ratio with environmen-
tal benefits without fully reflecting environmental costs.
The justifications for judicial review in the Trinity/Wallisville
decision find strong support in Montgomery v. Ellis.149 That case
concerned the adequacy of an impact statement filed by the Soil
Conservation Service for a stream channelization project on Blue-
Eye Creek in Alabama. 150 The District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Alabama: held the statement was insufficient in several re-
spects, including its failure to set forth the basis for conclusions
about costs and benefits and its arbitrary failure to employ a real-
istic interest rate and project life in computing costs and bene-
fits.' r The court held it had the power to review an arbitrary
and capricious agency determination under the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act ("APA")152 generally and a determination giving insuf-
ficient consideration to environmental values under NEPA. This
conclusion was buttressed by Calvert Cliffs"5 3 and Citizens to Pre-
serve Overton Park v. Volpe. 54 In the latter case, the United
States Supreme Court held agency decisions are only rarely ex-
empted from judicial review under the APA.' 55 The Court further
held the Secretary of Transportation's approval of a highway proj-
ect was reviewable under statutes requiring that highways be built
through parklands only if no "feasible and prudent" alternative
route exists'5 6 and then only if "all possible planning to minimize
149. 364 F. Supp. 517 (E.D. Ala. 1973). The court does not cite the Trin-
ity/Wallisville decision in reaching its conclusion.
150. Because of the peculiar method of appropriations used by the Soil
Conservation Service ("SCS"), the court sidestepped the problem of
prior Congressional authorization. See notes 132-35 and accompany-
ing text supra. SCS watershed projects are approved by Congres-
sional committees, not by Congress itself. Since Congressional com-
mittees cannot exercise legislative or executive powers, committee
approval of a watershed or channelization project cannot foreclosejudicial review of the cost-benefit determination. Even if the project
had received Congressional approval, the court said it would subject
the cost-benefit analysis to substantive review. 364 F. Supp. at 532
n.7.
151. 364 F. Supp. at 521-22, 529-33.
152. 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (1970); see note 17 supra.
153. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
154. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
155. Id. at 410. Accord, e.g., Abbott Laboratories, Inc. v. Gardner, 387
U.S. 136, 141 (1967).
156. 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1970).
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harm" to the park has been done.157
In Montgomery v. Ellis, project approval hinged upon deter-
mination by the Secretary of Agriculture that "the benefits exceed
the costs."'158 The court reasoned that this standard, as well as
NEPA's requirement to protect the environment "to the fullest ex-
tent possible,"'1 59 presented justiciable standards for agency con-
duct analogous to those in Overton Park. Since Congress has not
specifically committed either of these decisions to agency discre-
tion, the court could review arbitrary agency actions. 160 The court
further argued that fear of esoteric concepts should not deter a
court from its judicial duty to prescribe the bounds of arbitrary
agency action. 161
Regardless of whether the APA confers such authority, 162
NEPA requires courts to review agency cost-benefit analysis. Once
157. 23 U.S.C. § 138 (1970). The Court called the two highway statutes
"clear and specific directives," 401 U.S. at 411, despite the fact that
the statutory terms were obviously subject to differing interpretations
in various fact situations.
158. 16 U.S.C. § 1005 (1970). The court cites several agency decisions
under statutes granting the agencies discretionary authority which
have been held to be reviewable under the APA. See, e.g., Bar-
low v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970). The court argues the mandatory
cost-benefit balancing requirement creates an even clearer case for
APA review. 364 F. Supp. at 530-31.
159. § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1970).
160. 364 F. Supp. at 532.
161. "Where the administrative decision . . . is highly out-of-line
it is the court's function to reverse that determination. To do other-
wise would be to abdicate the judicial responsibility to require com-
pliance with the law." Id. at 533. An eminent appellate court judge
has offered a similar description of the role of reviewing courts un-
der NEPA:
If the balance struck by the agency is within a zone of rea-
sonableness, though it is not the one the court would itself
have preferred, it will be sustained, and this is the traditional
standard of administrative law. If the agency's decision, or
even the decisional approach, is considered by the court to
be obtuse or purblind, to be, in legal terms, outside the zone
of reasonableness, the particular formula of judicial review
will not be likely to preclude judicial inhibition or remand.
Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the Role of the
Courts, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 509, 529 (1974).
162. The argument for APA review of agency cost-benefit determinations
is weaker in the case of water projects planned under § 701a of the
Flood Control Act. 33 U.S.C. § 701a (1970). Unlike the Soil Con-
servation Service law, supra note 158, the cost-benefit clause in § 701a
is a statement of legislative policy, rather than a mandatory re-
quirement for a department or agency head. Hence, it is doubtful
that § 701a alone creates a reviewable standard for "agency action"
as that term is used in the APA.
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it is determined that agency decisions are reviewable on their mer-
its, courts must consider alleged deficiencies in the economic evalu-
ations of specific projects. While NEPA does not command agen-
cies to undertake cost-benefit analysis in the traditional sense, it
does open the sources of economic and technical justification to
outside scrutiny. Where cost-benefit analyses are required by law,
a rigorous examination of benefits and costs is necessary under
NEPA to know whether a project decision is arbitrary or insensi-
tive to threatened environmental amenities.
C. The Water Resource Standards and Substantive Review
Judicial review of non-NEPA cost-benefit analysis by water re-
source agencies, in the manner contemplated by Sierra Club v.
Froehlke and Montgomery v. Ellis, should be facilitated by the new
Principles and Standards for planning water resource projects.0 3
Though the standards are similar to previous cost-benefit guide-
lines, they do make a significant improvement by requiring agen-
cies to explain their decisions. Rather than producing a single,
numerical ratio to justify a project, an agency must explicate the
trade-offs being made between economic and environmental values.
Courts may thus review the agency's decision process to ascertain
whether environmental values have been given proper considera-
tion, instead of merely second-guessing calculations of specific costs
and benefits. In the past, courts may have been reluctant, for
example, to recompute the exact value of beneficial effects repre-
sented by an increased energy supply or enhanced recreational op-
portunities. But courts are well-equipped to consider whether en-
vironmental values have been arbitrarily ignored or undervalued
in relation to such economic benefits. 64
163. PRINCIPLES AmD STANDARDS, supra note 27; see notes 27-36 and ac-
companying text supra.
164. In EDF v. Ruckelshaus, 439 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1971), Judge Bazelon
observed:
As a result of expanding doctrines of standing and review-
ability, and new statutory causes of action, courts are increas-
ingly asked to review administrative action that touches on
fundamental personal interests in life, health, and liberty.
These interests have always had a special claim to judicial
protection, in comparison with the economic interests at stake
in a ratemaking or licensing proceeding.
Id. at 597-98 (footnotes omitted). Judge Bazelon's remarks are re-
miniscent of Justice Frankfurter's warning about the dangers of de-
ferring to administrative expertise in RCA v. United States, 341 U.S.
412 (1951). In that case, the Court refused to set aside Federal
Communications Commission standards for the transmission of color
television. Frankfurter expressed strong doubts:
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Substantive review of agency cost-benefit analysis would in-
volve two 'basic inquiries. A reviewing court should first ascertain
whether the final cost-benefit document accounts for all of the
significant costs and benefits which will result from the proposed
project. A full analysis of economic costs and 'benefits is no less
important now that agencies must also evaluate a project's impact
on an environmental objective. Projects still must generally show
a net dollar benefit in the "national economic development" ac-
count to be recommended.' 65  Overvaluing economic benefits or
undervaluing economic costs therefore could result in agency rec-
ommendation of a project without the required net dollar benefit.
In addition, the reviewing court should examine whether all of
the environmental costs and benefits are fully described in the "en-
vironmental quality" account. One potential abuse in creating
such a separate account is the temptation to "double count" certain
benefits such as recreation by treating them both as an economic
development benefit and as an environmental benefit. Finally, the
choice of interest rate and project life span for discounting pur-
poses are variables subject to agency manipulation. 166
Surely what constitutes the public interest on an issue like
this is not one of those expert matters as to which courts
should properly bow to the Commission's expertness...
[P]rophecy of technological feasibility is hardly in the do-
main of expertness so long as scientific and technological bar-
riers do not make the prospect fanciful. In any event, this
Court is not without experience in understanding the nature
of such complicated issues. We have had occasion before to
consider complex scientific matters.
341 U.S. at 424, 426 (citations omitted).
Judge Leventhal, also of the District of Columbia Circuit, has
written a vigorous defense of "independent" judicial review of agency
decisions under NEPA. Inter alia, he maintains "[r]eview to ensure
balance, coupled with restraint on the part of the reviewer, requires
a generalist who can penetrate the scientific explanation underlying a
decision just enough to test its soundness." Leventhal, supra note 159,
at 529. He offers a number of constructive suggestions for expediting
and improving judicial review of environmental decisions. See also
Sive, Some Thoughts of an Environmental Lawyer in the Wilderness
of Administrative Law, 70 COLUM. L. REv. 612 (1970).
165. See note 34 and accompanying text supra.
166. See note 20 supra. The new guidelines provide, "[t]he discount rate
will be established in accordance with the concept that the Govern-
ment's investment decisions are related to the cost of Federal bor-
rowing." PsmncILS AND STmiDARDs, supra note 27, at 24822. In-
terest rates are to be equivalent to the estimated average cost of
federal borrowing as reflected in the average yield on interest-bear-
ing marketable federal securities having periods to maturity compar-
able to a 50-year investment. Id. By creating a sliding interest stand-
ard, these guidelines appear to remove the question of discount
rates for new projects from agency discretion and court review. But
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The two decisions permitting judicial review of non-NEPA cost-
benefit analysis show how such review can illuminate and eliminate
imbalances in the economic analysis.167 Though they preceded the
new Principles and Standards, the cases considered abuses still pos-
sible under the revised format. The decision enjoining construc-
tion of the Wallisville reservoir project focused on the problem
of fully accounting for benefits-both environmental and economic
-without reflecting environmental costs. 168 As an example, in the
commercial fishing area, the analysis included a $29,000 annual
benefit for fresh-water fishing, but did not account for estimated
salt-water fishing losses of $500,000 annually. The statement in-
cluded benefits for fishing at the proposed reservoir but did not
contain information concerning persons who would continue to fish
if the Trinity River were left a free-flowing stream. 69 It also con-
tained recreation benefits based upon visitation statistics at other
Corps projects, but there were no less estimates of individuals cur-
rently using the site as a wilderness area. o
The Wallisville decision was critical of the use of recreation ben-
efits and an altered project life span to enhance the benefit-cost
ratio. The Corps estimated increases of 9,100,000 man-days of gen-
eral recreation and 4,900,000 man-days of hunting and fishing,
while the Fish and Wildlife Service and National Park Service
made estimates of 3,000,000 and 937,000 respectively. These and
other recreational benefits were then used to justify a project
whose main purpose was non-recreational.' 7 ' The record also
showed the Corps had altered the project life to achieve a more
favorable cost-benefit comparison. The benefit-cost ratio for the
full Trinity project was originally calculated on a one-hundred
agencies are still free to determine the appropriate life span or "pe-
riod of analysis" for a project. Id. Since prolonging the life span
reduces estimated costs, the life span selected merits close judicial
scrutiny.
167. Examples of other cases where substantive judicial review of cost-
benefit analysis might have produced opposite results may be found
in Note, Substantive Review, supra note 16, at 199-207; Note, En-
vironmental Law-Substantive Judicial Review Under the National
Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 51 N.C.L. Rxv. 145 (1972).
168. Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
169. Id. at 1368-69.
170. Id. at 1378.
171. For the Wallisville project alone, the costs of recreational facilities
equalled only about 3.5% of the total costs, but recreational benefits
accounted for 18.4% of the total. Similarly, for one reservoir that
was part of the Trinity project and had as its primary purpose flood
control and water supply, recreational facilities represented 12% of
the project costs but 70% of the claimed benefits. Id. at 1379,
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year life span, then reduced to a fifty year basis when the Bureau
of the Budget noted the latter was the normal life span for Corps
projects. This dropped the benefit-cost ratio from 1.4 to 1 down
to 0.74 to 1, prompting the Corps to defer construction of certain
navigation features.172
In Montgomery v. Ellis,'" the impact statement submitted by
the SCS indicated the project had a benefit-cost ratio of 1.05 to
1. The court criticized the statement for failing to specify the basis
of its cost-benefit determination. An affidavit by plaintiff's econ-
omist stated the erroneous inclusion of any benefits or the failure
to include any costs would reduce the ratio below unity. 74 The
court also took judicial notice that the current interest rate was
well above the 3/4 percent used by the SCS and the normal project
life was fifty years, not one hundred years as used in the state-
ment. Again referring to the economist's affidavit, the court said
even a slight increase in interest rate or shortening of the project
life span would reduce the benefit-cost ratio below unity.17 5
After a determination that an agency has accurately described
the costs and benefits, the second inquiry should be one made gen-
erally of all impact statements: Was the agency's decision to pro-
ceed arbitrary or did it give insufficient weight to environmental
values? 1'7  On the basis of the written decision record required
by the Principles and Standards, a court may judge whether the
decision is "arbitrary or capricious," an "abuse of discretion," or
-a "clear error of judgment.' 177 A non-NEPA cost-benefit determi-
nation should therefore be reversible under NEPA if it reflects
a lack of objectivity in evaluating environmental costs. Such lack
of objectivity may be reflected in an agency's refusal to take into
account local opposition to a project, use of the economic analysis
172. Id. at 1374.
173. 364 F. Supp. 517 (N.D. Ala. 1973).
174. Id. at 521-22.
175. Id. at 529.
176. See EDF v. Corps of Engineers, 470 F.2d 289, 300 (8th Cir. 1972).
As a practical matter, substantive review of cost-benefit analysis
under the PRINCIPLES AND STAnDARDS, and the impact statement will
be virtually identical since both documents require a trading off of
economic and environmental values. Requiring an agency to pre-
pare an EIS, in addition to regular cost-benefit analysis, does force
that agency to look at environmental quality as a paramount value,
not just one of several to be factored into a multiobjective ap-
proach.
177. These phrases are used interchangeably to describe the scope of re-
view to be conducted under the Administrative Procedure Act. See
Note, Substantive Review, supra note 17, at 180-8 & n,35.
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as a "promotional document," or undue influence of the factor of
previous investment in the project on the current decision to pro-
ceed.178 The substantive requirements of section 101(b) also pro-
vide standards for testing whether environmental values have been
accorded sufficient weight.
V. CONCLUSION
NEPA and the decisions permitting substantive review of
agency decisionmaking have reopened the issue of whether cost-
benefit analysis should be subject to judicial review. Much confu-
sion in this area could be eliminated by distinguishing between
the "cost-benefit balancing" required by NEPA and the cost-benefit
analysis normally conducted in connection with water resource
projects. Thus far, courts have uniformly rejected the argument
that NEPA mandates full quantification of environmental, eco-
nomic and technical costs and benefits. This Comment has shown
there are sound policy reasons for rejecting full quantification,
though these arguments have rarely been articulated by the courts.
Instead, courts should review project impact statements to see that
they include a full description of alternatives, together with the
environmental risks and economic costs and benefits which would
result. Most importantly, the impact statement must reveal the
agency has balanced the described costs and benefits in a manner
giving full weight to the environmental values at stake.
In the case of water resource agencies, where cost-benefit anal-
ysis is already an integral part of the decision process, this eco-
nomic analysis should be summarized in the impact statement and
subjected to substantive judicial review. Such review is necessary
because the cost-benefit document is central to the decision process
and embodies agency trade-offs between competing environmental
and economic values. As with impact statements generally, the
review should be limited in scope. Courts should ascertain first
178. These tests of agency objectivity are suggested in Note, Substantive
Review, supra note 16, at 194-99, 206-07. The author there recom-
mends criteria for substantive review of cost-benefit balancing based
on three abuses perceived under previous cost-benefit methods: lack
of specificity; imbalance in the cost-benefit ratios; and influence of
previous agency investment on the decision to proceed. Id. at 199-207.
Under the standards for review recommended here, the first two
criteria would be incorporated into the procedural inquiry, concerning
whether all costs and benefits have been accurately assessed. The
third suggested criterion would be subsumed by the second inquiry,
concerning the objectivity of the agency decision based upon the cost-
benefit document.
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whether all significant costs and benefits are accurately accounted
for and second whether the agency decision to proceed was arbi-
trary or ignored important environmental considerations. The new
Principles and Standards should promote such substantive review,
since they require full explication of both economic and environ-
mental factors. The Principles and Standards also open to judicial
scrutiny the reasoning behind an agency's choice of objectives and
its decision to proceed with a given plan.
David R. Buntain '75
